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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Steven Patrick Droogs appeals from the judgement entered upon his conditional
plea of guilty to battery with intent to commit a serious felony. He argues that the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. In the alternative, he argues that
the district court imposed an excessive sentence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Deputy Solar Larsen was in his patrol car when he observed Defendant-Appellant
Steven Patrick Droogs walking.

(10/30/17 Tr., p.22, Ls.3-21; p.24, Ls.8-17.)

He

considered it strange to see someone walking in that area, which was rural, heavilywooded, and not well-travelled (10/30/17 Tr., p.26, Ls.1-6); at that time, around 7 a.m.
(10/30/17 Tr., p.24, Ls.8-23); and in “pretty bad weather,” while it was snowing and the
temperature was around 15 degrees Fahrenheit (10/30/17 Tr., p.23, Ls.4-7; p.24, Ls.1823). Concerned for Droogs’ well-being, Deputy Larsen stopped to ask if he was alright.
(10/30/17 Tr., p.26, L.24 – p.27, L.13.) Droogs responded that he was and that he was
“‘walking to a friend’s house.’” (Id.) Deputy Larsen then asked if Droogs wanted a ride.
(Id.) Droogs did not respond, but appeared nervous and “fidgety,” which Deputy Larsen
thought could be attributable to the cold or to nervousness around law enforcement.
(10/30/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.14-25.)

But Deputy Larsen also recognized that Droogs’

demeanor was consistent with a person under the influence of a controlled substance.
(10/30/17 Tr., p.29, L.1 – p.31, L.8.) Deputy Larsen then asked if he could see Droogs’
identification. (10/30/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.14-25.) Droogs responded that he did not have any
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identification (id.), but gave his name as “Patrick Nichols” and his
. (10/30/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.1-12). Droogs’

. (PSI, p.1. 1)

Still believing that Droogs may be interested in a ride, Deputy Larsen asked
Droogs to step over to the patrol car so that he could quickly pat him down for weapons
before giving him a ride. (10/30/17 Tr., p.31, Ls.9-16.) As a matter of course, no one is
allowed into a patrol car without being checked for weapons. (10/30/17 Tr., p.24, Ls.27.) Droogs came over to the patrol car and Deputy Larsen asked him to briefly put his
hands behind his back so that he could pat Droogs down for weapons. (10/30/17 Tr.,
p.31, L.17 – p.32, L.5.) Though Droogs began to do so, he abruptly ran. (Id.) As
Deputy Larsen followed, he repeatedly instructed Droogs to stop. (10/30/17 Tr., p.36,
L.19 – p.38, L.20.) Droogs refused, yelling that he had a gun, that he was not going back,
and “‘You’re going to have to fucking kill me.’” (Id.)
Droogs eventually entered a house. (10/30/17 Tr., p.41, L.14 – p.42, L.1.) When
the homeowners exited, they gave officers permission to enter and remove Droogs.
(10/30/17 Tr., p.64, Ls.4-11.) He was located hiding in the attic and, for over an hour,
ignored repeated commands to come down. (10/30/17 Tr., p.66, L.14 – p.67, L.16.)
Deputy Nathan Nelson attempted to enter the attic with a police dog and Droogs
responded by repeatedly hitting Deputy Nelson with fiberglass insulation and punching
him. (10/30/17 Tr., p.67, L.17 – p.71, L.7.) Droogs was then subdued by use of a police
dog and O.C. spray, and was removed from the attic. (10/30/17 Tr., p.71, L.8 – p.72,
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References to “PSI” are to the Presentence Report, and attachments thereto, contained in
the forty-six page pdf file titled “DROOGS, Steven SC #4582 Sealed.”
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L.4.) More than three hours passed between Deputy Larsen’s initial contact with Droogs
and when officers removed him from the house. (10/30/17 Tr., p.44, Ls.14-18.)
The state charged Droogs with felony assault or battery upon an officer in
violation of Idaho Code section 18-915; misdemeanor providing false information to law
enforcement in violation of Idaho Code section 18-5413; and misdemeanor obstructing
an officer in violation of Idaho Code section 18-705. (R., pp.219-21.) He was also
charged as a persistent violator. (Id.)
Droogs filed a Motion to Suppress, asking the court to suppress “any and all
statements, observations, evidence, information or any other evidentiary fruits obtained
as a result of the detention, arrest, search, seizure, and subsequent questioning of the
Defendant in this matter.” (R., pp.129-30.) He later filed a memorandum in support (R.,
pp.142-56) in which he argued that Deputy Larsen’s initial interaction with Droogs
constituted an unlawful detention that “was flagrant enough to warrant exclusion of
evidence discovered as a result of the stop,” notwithstanding any attenuation between the
allegedly unlawful detention and the discovery of the evidence (R., pp.146-51). He also
argued that the use of a police dog to secure his compliance was an excessive use of
force. (R., pp.151-56.)
After a hearing, the district court issued a memorandum decision denying Droogs’
motion. (R., pp.202-16.) The court initially noted that Droogs had not identified with any
specificity the evidence he was moving to suppress, improperly leaving the court “to
guess.” (R., pp.210-11.) It found that Deputy Larsen’s interaction with Droogs was
initially a proper exercise of his community caretaking function, but evolved into an
unlawful detention when “Deputy Larsen directed Droogs to his vehicle, ordered him to

3

place his hands behind his back, and then held them while patting him down without
justification.” (R., pp.211-12.) But this detention lasted “an extremely brief period of
time,” as “Droogs broke free and fled on foot,” at which point he was not detained, and
there was no evidence gathered during that very brief period of detention to suppress.
(Id.)

The court then held that evidence of a battery on Deputy Nelson was not

suppressible for the additional reason that “‘when a suspect responds to an
unconstitutional search or seizure by a physical attack on the officer, evidence of this new
crime is admissible notwithstanding the prior illegality.’” (R., p.211 (quoting State v.
Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 509, 198 P.3d 735, 738 (Ct. App. 2008)).

The court also

concluded that any evidence gathered while Droogs was in the attic was too attenuated
from the unlawful detention to be suppressed. (R., pp.212-15.) Finally, as to the claim
that officers used excessive force by employing a police dog, the court held that that
question should be resolved by a jury and was not appropriately decided on a motion to
suppress. (R., p.215.)
Droogs agreed to enter a conditional Alford 2 plea to battery with intent to commit
a serious felony, retaining the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, in
exchange for which the state would drop the other charges and recommend a unified
sentence of twenty years with ten years fixed. (R., p.218.) The district court accepted
that plea. (11/9/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.15-19; p.12, Ls.6-11.)
In accordance with the plea agreement, the state recommended a unified sentence
of twenty years with ten years fixed. (1/12/18 Tr., p.88, L.21 – p.90, L.18.) Droogs
requested a unified sentence of five years with three years fixed. (1/12/18 Tr., p.94, L.22

2

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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– p.95, L.1.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of sixteen years with six years
fixed.

(1/12/18 Tr., p.100, Ls.20-23; R., pp.228-29.)

Droogs was on parole for

involuntary manslaughter at the time he committed this offense. (1/12/18 Tr., p.90, L.13
– p.91, L.13.) He requested that his sentence in this matter run concurrently with the
remainder of his sentence for the involuntary manslaughter conviction. (Id.) The district
court ordered that it do so. (R., pp.228-29.)
Droogs timely appealed. (R., pp.230-33.)

5

ISSUES
Droogs states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Droogs’ motion to
suppress?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr.
Droogs to a unified term of sixteen years, with six years fixed, for
battery with the intent to commit a serious felony?

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Droogs failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress?

2.

Has Droogs failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
sentenced him to a unified term of sixteen years, with six years fixed, for battery
with the intent to commit a serious felony?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Droogs Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
Droogs concedes that the the evidence he sought to suppress below was not

“derived from the exploitation of his unlawful detention.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) The
district court therefore properly denied his motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accept[s] the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the court] freely review[s]
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Kapelle, 158
Idaho 121, 124, 344 P.3d 901, 904 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho
559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996)). “At a suppression hearing, the power to
assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” Id. (citing State v. Valdez-Molina, 127
Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999)).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That No Evidence Was Secured As A
Result Of The Exploitation Of Droogs’ Unlawful Detention
“Generally, evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search or as a result of

an unlawful seizure may not be used against the victim of the search.” Padilla v. State,
158 Idaho 184, 187, 345 P.3d 243, 246 (Ct. App. 2014). “To determine whether to
7

suppress evidence as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ the court must inquire whether the
evidence has been recovered as a result of the exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” State v. Page, 140
Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004). “Before the exclusionary rule is invoked at
all, the challenged evidence must be ‘in some sense the product of illegal government
activity.’” State v. Hiassen, 110 Idaho 608, 610, 716 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Ct. App. 1986)
(quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)). “Thus, where a defendant moves
to suppress evidence allegedly gained through unconstitutional police conduct, the
defendant bears an initial burden of going forward with evidence to show a
factual nexus between the illegality and the state’s acquisition of the evidence.” State v.
Keene, 144 Idaho 915, 918, 174 P.3d 885, 888 (Ct. App. 2007). “Subsequently, the state
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that the challenged evidence is
untainted.” Id.
As the district court recognized, Droogs did not identify with any specificity the
evidence he attempted to suppress. (R., pp.210-11.) Instead, he sought to suppress “any
and all statements, observations, evidence, information or any other evidentiary fruits
obtained as a result of the detention, arrest, search, and subsequent questioning of the
Defendant in this matter,” but without pointing to any such statements, observations,
evidence, etc. (R., pp.129-30). On appeal, he provides the same broad characterization
of the evidence that the district court allegedly should have suppressed. (Appellant’s
brief, p.8.) Droogs cannot carry his burden to provide evidence supporting a factual
nexus between the alleged illegal conduct and the discovery of the relevant evidence
without identifying the relevant evidence. See State v. Hudson, 133 Idaho 543, 545, 989
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P.2d 285, 287 (1999) (“Hudson has failed to identify, either at the district court level or
on appeal, what evidence seized from Hudson after the allegedly illegal stop should have
been

suppressed.

Consequently,

any

attempt

by

this

Court

to

identify

such evidence would be pure supposition.”).
Though that fact alone establishes that the district court correctly denied Droogs’
motion, the district court also correctly concluded that no evidence was gathered through
the exploitation of illegal government activity. (R., pp.210-15.) Droogs concedes on
appeal that the district court was correct. (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)
The district court found that Droogs was unlawfully detained “when Deputy
Larsen directed Droogs to his vehicle, ordered him to place his hands behind his back,
and then held them while patting him down without justification.” (R., pp.211-12.) As
soon as Deputy Larsen began to check Droogs for weapons, Droogs ran. (10/30/17 Tr.,
p.31, L.17 – p.32, L.5.) After he ran, he was not detained. See Padilla v. State, 161
Idaho 624, 626, 389 P.3d 169, 171 (2016) (“A seizure does not occur until a person is
either physically restrained by the police or yields to a show of authority and stops.”);
State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 436, 146 P.3d 697, 702 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that,
where suspect initially complied with unlawful police demands to remain seated but then
fled while police gave chase, the unlawful detention ended when the suspect fled). The
allegedly unlawful detention therefore occurred over “an extremely brief period of time”
and there was no evidence gathered during that very brief period to suppress. (R., p.212.)
Evidence gathered while Droogs was fleeing from Deputy Larsen is not
suppressible. Idaho courts have repeatedly and consistently held that where a defendant
flees from police rather than submitting to a detention, evidence gathered during that
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flight is not suppressible solely because the detention would have been unlawful had the
defendant complied. See, e.g., Zuniga, 143 Idaho at 436-37, 146 P.3d at 702-03 (where
defendant initially complied with police, though detention was unlawful, but then fled
while police chased, district court properly denied motion to suppress methamphetamine
thrown by defendant during chase); Padilla, 161 Idaho at 627-28, 389 P.3d at 172-73
(holding that methamphetamine discarded while fleeing from police was not
suppressible); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 590-93, 903 P.2d 752, 755-58 (Ct. App.
1995) (holding that cocaine and marijuana discarded while fleeing from police was not
suppressible).
Evidence regarding Droogs’ battery of Deputy Nelson is not suppressible for that
and an additional reason.

“It appears to be a nearly universal rule in American

jurisdictions [including Idaho] that when a suspect responds to an unconstitutional search
or seizure by a physical attack on the officer, evidence of this new crime is admissible
notwithstanding the prior illegality.” 3 State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 509, 198 P.3d 735,
738 (Ct. App. 2008). “[A]lthough officers may have conducted an unconstitutional
search or seizure, a subsequent attack on the officer is a new crime unrelated to any prior
illegality.” Id. at 510, 198 P.3d at 739. “Because there has been no exploitation of the
officer’s unconstitutional conduct, the purpose of the exclusionary rule—to deter police

3

This is not to concede that the seizure of Droogs from the home was unlawful. By that
point, Droogs fled from Deputy Larsen, threatened him with a weapon, yelled “‘You’re
going to have to fucking kill me’” (10/30/17 Tr., p.36, L.19 – p.38, L.20), entered a home
he did not own (10/30/17 Tr., p.41, L.14 – p.42, L.1), and the homeowners gave police
permission to enter the home and remove Droogs (10/30/17 Tr., p.64, Ls.4-11). Police
had probable cause to seize him and remove him from the home, notwithstanding any
alleged illegality in Deputy Larsen’s initial interaction with Droogs. Still, even if they
did not have probable cause to seize him and remove him from the home, evidence
regarding Droogs’ battery of Deputy Nelson is not suppressible.
10

misconduct—would not be advanced by suppressing evidence of the attack on the
officer.” Id. See also State v. Deisz, 145 Idaho 826, 831, 186 P.3d 682, 687 (Ct. App.
2008) (holding that evidence of violent resistance to police was not suppressible,
notwithstanding illegality of search and seizure, and noting that “[a] contrary ruling
‘would effectively give the victim of police misconduct carte blanche to respond with any
means, however violent.’” (quoting People v. Doke, 171 P.3d 237, 241 (Colo. 2007));
State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 627, 768 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to
suppress evidence having “to do with Wren’s altercation with the officers, upon which he
is charged with battery and resisting arrest” because “this evidence flowed not from the
arrest but from Wren’s conduct” while being arrested, notwithstanding allegations that
the arrest was unlawful).
On appeal, Droogs argues only that Deputy Larsen’s initial interaction with him
was “flagrant enough” to require the exclusion of evidence gathered during Droogs’
flight and while hiding in the attic. (Appellant’s brief, p.8. 4) That is mistaken for two
reasons.
First, the flagrancy of police misconduct is a factor in the “attenuation doctrine,”
which provides that evidence that was “the fruit of police misconduct” may nevertheless
be admissible if its discovery was sufficiently attenuated from the misconduct. State v.

4

Droogs does not address his argument below that the police used excessive force when
they employed a police dog. “When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions
of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered.” State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Even so, the district court properly held that the
question whether police used excessive force is for the jury and is independent of any
motion to suppress. (R., p.215.) See State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 627, 768 P.2d 1351,
1360 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that defendant’s claim of excessive force was irrelevant to
motion to suppress, though it potentially provided a defense to the charges of battery and
resisting arrest).
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Bigham, 141 Idaho 732, 734, 117 P.3d 146, 148 (Ct. App. 2005). Here, as discussed
above and as acknowledged by Droogs (Appellant’s brief, p.8), there was no evidence
that was the fruit of police misconduct. Police did not discover evidence of criminal
conduct by means of Deputy Larsen’s brief detention of Droogs. Instead, the relevant
evidence involved only observation of Droogs’ conduct after he was no longer detained,
including his battery of Deputy Nelson. Because there was no evidence that was the fruit
of police misconduct, there is nothing to suppress.
Second, the district court correctly determined that, “[e]ven if Droogs attempted
to stretch the exclusionary rule from the temporary seizure to his stand-off in the attic,”
evidence regarding his stand-off would be admissible because “the temporal proximity is
too great with too many intervening circumstances between them.” (R., p.213.) That is,
the district court determined that even if there were evidence that constituted fruit of
police misconduct, the attenuation doctrine would apply and render the evidence
admissible. To determine whether the discovery of evidence is sufficiently attenuated
from police misconduct to make the evidence admissible, courts look to three factors:
“(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the
occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the
improper law enforcement action.” State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459
(2004).
More than three hours passed between Deputy Larsen’s brief detention of Droogs
and when he was removed from the attic (10/30/17 Tr., p.44, Ls.14-18), during which
time Droogs threatened police with a weapon (10/30/17 Tr., p.36, L.19 – p.38, L.20),
entered someone else’s home and refused to leave (10/30/17 Tr., p.41, L.14 – p.42, L.1;
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p.64, Ls.4-11; p.66, L.14 – p.67, L.16), and physically attacked Deputy Nelson when he
tried to remove Droogs from the home (10/30/17 Tr., p.67, L.17 – p.71, L.7). The district
court also found that, though Deputy Larsen very briefly detained Droogs unlawfully, “it
was not the type of purposeful or flagrant misconduct in need of sanctioning” and “the
purpose of Deputy Larsen’s misconduct was investigatory in nature and motivated by a
sense of officer safety and not for the purpose of a ‘fishing expedition.’” (R., p.214.) At
the hearing on his motion to suppress, Droogs appeared to concede as much, stating that
Deputy Larsen’s conduct, while illegal, was “diligent policing” and “wasn’t malicious”
or “anything else.” (10/30/18 Tr., p.85, Ls.9-17.) The district court properly denied
Droogs’ motion to suppress and this Court should affirm that denial.

II.
Droogs Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Droogs asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a

unified sentence of sixteen years with six years fixed for battery with the intent to commit
a serious felony. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11.) Considering the objectives of sentencing,
his extensive criminal history, and the nature of his crime, Droogs has failed to establish
an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review only for

an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).
The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the sentencing court clearly abused its
discretion. Id.
13

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
Because Droogs does not claim that his sentence is outside statutory limits, he

must show that the district court clearly abused its discretion. That is, he must show that,
“‘under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the
objectives of criminal punishment.’” Id. (quoting State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933,
104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005)). This Court will not “substitute [its] view for that of a
sentencing judge where reasonable minds might differ.” State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,
568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).

“A sentence is reasonable if it appears

necessary to achieve the primary objectives of protecting society or the related sentencing
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 797,
69 P.3d 1052, 1058 (2003). “Not all of the sentencing factors, even the most important
factor of protection of society, need be advanced by a sentence if the sentence is
appropriate in light of one or more than one such criterion.” State v. Wersland, 125
Idaho 499, 504, 873 P.2d 144, 149 (1994).

The “reasonableness of a sentence is

determined by looking to the probable term of confinement,” which is the fixed portion
of the sentence. Id. at 503, 873 P.2d at 148.
The district court here considered the appropriate sentencing factors. (1/12/18
Tr., p.98, L.23 – p.101, L.7) The court also ordered and considered a new presentence
investigation report, substance abuse evaluation, and mental health evaluation. (1/12/18
Tr., p.98, Ls.8-20.) After reviewing Droogs’ prior criminal history, the court found that
Droogs has “been a danger to society” and “continued to be a danger to the officers in
this case.” (1/12/18 Tr., p.99, Ls. 12-17.) Droogs’ “adult criminal record reveals he has
accumulated 23 primary charges,” that “[t]he instant offense is his fifth adult felony
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conviction,” with “three additional felony charges in an unrelated inactive case.” (PSI,
p.8. 5) Droogs was on parole for involuntary manslaughter at the time he committed the
offense for which he was convicted here (PSI, pp.4, 7-9; Appellant’s brief, p.3 n.2), and,
according to defense counsel, had approximately four years remaining on that sentence
(1/12/18 Tr., p.91, Ls.9-13).
The court additionally considered the nature of Droogs’ offense. (1/12/18 Tr.,
p.100, Ls.3-8.) Droogs threatened Deputy Larsen with a weapon and stated, “You’re
going to have to fucking kill me” (10/30/17 Tr., p.36, L.19 – p.38, L.20), then hid in a
home in which he did not have permission to be while refusing commands to come out
(10/30/17 Tr., p.41, L.14 – p.42, L.1; p.64, Ls.4-11; p.66, L.14 – p.67, L.16), and
physically attacked Deputy Nelson when he tried to remove Droogs from the home
(10/30/17 Tr., p.67, L.17 – p.71, L.7).
Droogs contends that the district court’s sentence was excessive in light of the
mitigating factors he presented: his history of abusing drugs, his alleged accountability
and remorse, and his alleged “motivation to become a productive, law-abiding member of
society.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.) The district court considered these mitigating
factors in its sentencing analysis. At the sentencing hearing, both Droogs (1/12/18 Tr.,
p.97, L.15 – p.98, L.7) and his counsel (1/12/18 Tr., p.90, L.24 – p.97, L.12) extensively
discussed his alleged remorse and hope to become a productive member of society.
Droogs’ PSI extensively addresses his history of substance abuse and previous, failed
attempts at substance abuse treatment. (PSI, pp.13, 19-20.) The district court stated that

5

Those three additional charges later resulted in a felony conviction for burglary and a
five year determinate sentence. iCourt Portal, State v. Droogs, Nez Perce County District
Court Case No. CR-2016-8760.
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its sentencing determination was based on arguments at the sentencing hearing, including
from Droogs and his attorney, as well as the PSI. (1/12/18 Tr., p.98, Ls. 8-20.)
After considering the facts of the case and the objectives of criminal punishment,
the district court reasonably determined that imposing a unified sentence of sixteen years
with six years fixed for Droogs’ conviction for battery with the intent to commit a serious
felony was appropriate “based upon the protection of society and punishment.” (1/12/18
Tr., p.101, Ls.3-4.) In doing so, it imposed a sentence less than that recommended by the
state (1/12/18 Tr., p.88, L.22 – p.89, L.1), and accepted Droogs’ request for the sentence
to run concurrently with the remainder of his sentence for involuntary manslaughter
(1/12/18 Tr., p.91, Ls.9-13; R., pp.228-29). Under any reasonable view of the facts,
Droogs has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s denial of
Droogs’ Motion to Suppress and affirm his sentence for battery with intent to commit a
serious felony.
DATED this 26th day of February, 2019.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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